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Abstract  
Exploiting a unique set of longitudinal household data collected in a Philippine village over a 
thirty year period (1962-1994), this paper seeks to identify the pathways of exiting rural poverty 
and also the determinants of middle class stability.  We also test the changes in the returns on 
assets in exiting poverty after the 1980s.  We find that better access to land facilitates 
accumulation in agriculture while schooling has positive effects on upward mobility in both 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors.  Macroeconomic growth was, however, the key 
determinant of poverty-exit probabilities until the early 1980s.  After the 1980s, poverty exit-
paths through ‘agricultural ladder’ narrowed, schooling and growth became equally crucial 
determinants due to the increased returns to schooling (mainly due to the expansion of the 
international migration opportunities), and labor endowments also became important for the 
lower, but not upper, social strata (providing an economic incentive to have more children for the 
poor).  Unlike the typical findings from poverty dynamics in the US, we find no evidence of state 
dependence in the poverty spells.  This suggests that the village economy under study is quite 
dynamic so that policy interventions addressing the observed determinants (especially access to 
education and economic growth) could well go a long way in pulling the poor out of poverty in 
the rural Philippines. 
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1. Introduction 
 Poverty dynamics in developing countries is a relatively under-studied area of research.1  
If major pathways for exiting poverty are empirically identified in country(or region)-specific 
contexts, policy interventions could be designed for facilitating escape from poverty.  One reason 
for the paucity of such studies, despite their immediate policy relevance, is the lack of 
appropriate data.  While a long panel such as the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) has been utilized for analyzing poverty dynamics in the United States, equivalent data 
sources, and studies based on such data, in developing countries remain rare.  This paper exploits 
a unique set of longitudinal micro data covering the period between 1962 and 1994 in the rural 
Philippines, and seeks to identify determinants of exiting poverty and of middle class stability by 
examining the processes of socio-economic class mobility among households within the village 
community.   
 This paper builds on three branches of the economics literature.  First, the conceptual 
framework adopted in this paper is based on the theoretical literature on the evolution of social 
stratification, where the introduction of the assumption of credit market imperfections into the 
household model framework has led to the development of the models deriving various patterns 
of social stratification as multiple equilibria (e. g., Banerjee and Newman 1993, Galor and Zeira 
1993 and Ljungqvist 1993).2  Secondly, this paper intends to extend the empirical literature on 
poverty dynamics in the United States (or in other developed countries) by allowing us to address 
the question: how do the poverty dynamics differ between rich and poor countries?  Studies 
based on PSID have found, for example, that age, race, education, female headship (or more 
generally, changes in the household composition), higher macroeconomic growth are significant 
determinants of the exit probabilities from poverty and also that the length of poverty ‘spells’ (i. 
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e., the length of past incidence of being in poverty) significantly affects the probability of exiting 
or entering poverty (e. g., Bane and Ellwood 1986, Stevens 1994, 1995, Hanratty and Blank 
1992, Sawhill 1988).  Since poverty in developing countries (including that in the Philippines) is 
a predominantly rural phenomenon while a major portion of poverty is found in urban areas in 
rich countries (especially in the United Stats), for instance, the determinants of poverty dynamics 
could potentially differ between these two groups of countries.  This paper can be seen as a crude 
initial step toward addressing such a question.   
 Thirdly, this paper extends the relatively small empirical literature on the determinants of 
economic mobility in developing countries.  While most of the earlier empirical studies of 
economic mobility in developing countries use transition matrices to characterize the degree of 
mobility,3 there have recently emerged studies that examine the determinants of mobility.  They 
have identified factors such as household asset holdings, human capital, and life-cycle, among 
others (e. g., Gaiha and Deolalikar 1993, Fuwa 1999, Grootaeat, et al. 1995, Jalan and Ravallion 
2000, etc. See Baulch and Hoddinot 2000 for a survey).  These studies typically examine changes 
over time in income or consumption expenditures for a relatively short period of time (mostly up 
to 5 years).4  Recent studies on income or consumption mobility also find, however, that a 
relatively large portion of such mobility observed contains so called ‘transitory’ poverty resulting 
from the changes in income due to short term misfortunes or good luck, as well as measurement 
errors (e. g., Baulch and Hoddinott 2000, McCullock and Baulch 2000), and that factors affecting 
transitory poverty are quite different from those affecting ‘chronic poverty,’ which is what really 
matters for policy makers (e. g., Helme forthcoming, Jalan and Ravallion 2000).  Furthermore, 
partly due to the relatively short time horizons observed, few studies have examined the impact 
of economic environments (e. g., the speed of macroeconomic growth), changes over time in the 
  3
relative importance among the determinants of poverty dynamics, or potentials for state 
dependence.  This paper fills in such gaps in the empirical literature on poverty dynamics in 
developing countries.   
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  The next section briefly describes the study 
village and the unique features of our data set.  Section 3 describes the class structure in the 
village, its changes, and the household class mobility patterns during the thirty year period.  
Section 4 presents a theoretical framework for analyzing socio-economic mobility and then 
derives our empirical specification.  Section 5 presents the estimation results and interpretations.  
In section 6 we return to those questions raised in this section in relation to the existing literature.  
And Section 7 draws our conclusions with some policy implications.   
2. The Village Setting And The Data Features 
 Our study village is located in the central part of Pangasinan province on Luzon island in 
the Philippines.  The village is located roughly 170 km north of Manila.  While the village did 
not have a telephone line, 67% of the households had access to electricity as of 1994.  The size of 
the village is roughly one square mile.  The principal food crop in the village is rice.  Also 
cultivated during our data period were sugar, tobacco, vegetables (corn, mongo beans, tomatoes, 
beans and eggplants) and a variety of fruits (e.g., mango).  Most of the farmers adopted high 
yielding rice varieties (HYV) during the mid- to late-1970s.  Unlike some other parts of Central 
Luzon, however, the village farmers have not been able to acquire the maximum benefit from the 
adoption of HYV due to insufficient irrigation.   
 House-to-house censuses by total enumeration were conducted in the village six times 
between 1962 and 1994: 1962, 1966, 1971, 1976, 1981 and 1994.  Our data include information 
on household demographics and some asset holdings such as land but little information is 
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collected on income (except in 1994) or on consumption expenditures.5  As a result, while the 
study of economic mobility can typically use as the outcome variable either (continuous) income 
or consumption expenditures applying component-of-variance models (e. g., Lillard and Willis 
1978) or (discrete) state transitions—such as the entry into and exit from poverty— applying 
transition probability or hazard rate models (e. g., Bane and Ellwood 1986, Stevens, 1994, 1995), 
we take the latter approach focusing on the movements of households across socio-economic 
classes (to be defined in the next section in terms of land holdings and occupations).   
 Our focus on class mobility has a few advantages over the studies based on income or 
expenditure mobility as typically found in the literature.  First, our approach is suitable for 
identifying poverty dynamics among the ‘chronically poor’ rather than the ‘transitory poor.’  Past 
studies on poverty dynamics and economic mobility have found that observed poverty dynamics 
based on such welfare measures as income or consumption expenditures contain a large portion 
of the ‘transitory poor,’6 and that the determinants of the transitory poverty are different from 
those of the chronic poverty (e. g., Jalan and Ravallion 2000).  Dreze, Lanjouw and Stern (1992) 
further argue that the group of ‘poor’ people (or poor households) identified based on 
occupational categories (e. g., such as agricultural laborer) tend to be more stable where the 
majority are the chronically poor, and thus certain occupational categories could be a better 
indicator of chronic poverty than income or expenditure.  Helme (forthcoming) also advocates 
departure from income or consumption expenditure-based definitions toward a focus on assets in 
identifying chronically poor.  Our approach in this paper follows such arguments.  Our unit of 
observation is a change (or no-change) in social class status of a household over a period of five 
years; a five year period is likely to be long enough to observe at least some degrees of changes 
in land holdings and occupations which tend to be more stable than typical welfare measures.7  In 
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addition, we also include tests of state dependence in the household class position, which amount 
to examining mobility dynamics over 10 year periods.  By examining the mobility in social 
classes over the long term, our attempt here is to focus on the changes in the level of economic 
welfare that are likely to have lasting effects on the households.   
 The second advantage in our approach is that land holdings and occupational categories 
are easier variables to measure than are typical welfare measures.  Measurement errors typically 
pose major difficulties in identifying poverty dynamics based on income or consumption 
expenditures since they inflate the variances of the ‘true’ welfare measures (e. g., Bauluch and 
Hoddinot 2000).  Our analysis of economic mobility based on social class categories is likely to 
suffer less of such difficulties.   
 An additional advantage of our data set is the fact that all the households in the village at 
the time of each survey are included (i. e., total enumeration).  In collecting longitudinal survey 
data in a large scale, there typically is a tradeoff between obtaining a representative sample and 
tracking individual dynamics (e. g, Deaton 1997, p.20).  A usual limitation of panel data where a 
same set of sample households is followed over time is that a representative sample in the initial 
time period tends to become increasingly less representative as the composition of the population 
changes, a limitation that becomes exacerbated as the observation period becomes longer.  Since 
our dataset covers all the households at every survey we can observe the representative (in fact, 
the entire) patterns of the mobility dynamics within the village throughout the thirty year period.   
 To be balanced against these advantages, however, are a few limitations of the data set.  
One obvious limitation of our study is its being a single village study; conclusions derived from 
our study may not necessarily be generalized to cover other parts of the rural Philippines.  
Another limitation is the fact that our data do not follow those households that moved out of the 
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village (we will discuss the implications of this in the next section and Appendix).   
3. Class Structure And Mobility Patterns In The Village 
 In order to identify alternative exit paths from poverty in the study village, we categorize 
village households into four socio-economic classes and analyze the determinants of the 
movements of households across class boundaries.  Our notion of socio-economic class follows 
that of Anderson (1964) and is based on the degree of access to agricultural land and the 
occupation type of the main income earner of the household,8 consisting of: Irregularly-
Employed; Tenant-Farmer; Small-Owner; and Regularly-Employed.  The class of Irregularly-
Employed consists of landless-laborer households who have little or no access to agricultural 
land nor to secure employment; the main income earners of these households are engaged in 
various casual agricultural (e. g., planting, harvesting) or non-agricultural (e. g., carpentry, hired 
tricycle driving) jobs.  Tenant-Farmer households are the households where the main income 
earners are farm operators without land ownership.  On the other hand, Small-Owner households 
own agricultural land of at least one third of a hectare.9  In addition to these social strata based on 
access to land, there is a distinct class of the non-agricultural Regularly-Employed households 
which derive primary income from secure non-agricultural employment or enterprise (e. g., 
school teachers, full-time employees in private businesses, owner-operators of local transport 
services, variety store owners, etc.).  This class category also includes the households deriving 
the major portion of their income from household members working abroad.  Although all the 
households in the Regularly-Employed class are not uniformly wealthy, the wealthiest 
households in the village have tended to belong to this class and they constitute a part of the 
middle-class at the national level in the Philippines.   
 Table 1 summarizes per capita household income and poverty incidence as of 1994 by 
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social classes.  It shows that the average per capita incomes among the Irregularly-Employed and 
Tenant farmers are similar and are below the poverty line of P6,000,10 while the average per 
capita income among Small-Owners is above the poverty line and that of the Regularly-
Employed is more than twice the Small-Owners’.  The incidence of poverty follows similar 
patterns across class categories.  In our following discussions, we consider the households 
belonging to the Irregularly-Employed and the Tenant classes as the “poor households.”11   
 Table 2 shows the changes in the village class structure over the thirty year period.  We 
can see that the degree of dependence on the agricultural sector for livelihood among the village 
households declined significantly throughout the thirty year period, as reflected in the sharp 
decline in the proportion of the Small-Owner households and in the moderate decline in the 
proportion of the Tenant-Farmer households.  On the other hand, the proportion of the poorest 
section of the village community, the Irregularly-Employed, increased substantially through the 
1960s and the 1970s and then declined moderately after the 1980s.  The share of the Regularly-
Employed households increased drastically during the thirty year period, thereby becoming the 
largest social class category by 1994, partly due to the increasing number of households relying 
on their children who have secure non-agricultural occupations (many of them abroad, as we will 
see below) for their main income support.   
As a rough summary of the mobility patterns over the thirty year period, Table 3 shows 
the changes in the class status of a panel of households between 1962 and 1994, as obtained by 
tracing only the 262 households found in the first round of the census in 1962.  Not surprisingly a 
majority of the original 262 households, 32 years later, were no longer found in the village as of 
1994 (either by emigration or by household dissolution mostly precipitated by the death of the 
household head).  Among those still present as of 1994, there are very few cases of downward 
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mobility among the initial Small-Owners and the Regularly-Employed.  Among the lower strata 
of the Irregularly-Employed and Tenant farmers, however, there appears to be a polarization of a 
sort; among the Tenant-Farmers as of 1962, roughly the same numbers of households are found 
in 1994 across the Regularly-Employed (i. e., upwardly mobile), Tenant (i. e., no mobility), and 
the Irregularly-Employed (i.e., downwardly mobile), and roughly the same numbers of what used 
to be Irregularly-Employed households as of 1962 are found, in 1994, in the Irregularly-
Employed (i. e., no mobility) and in the Regularly-Employed (i. e., upwardly mobile) class.  
Taken together, it appears, there was more upward mobility (mostly toward the Regularly-
Employed status) than downward mobility among the village households between 1962 and 
1994.   
Table 2 (the bottom row) and Table 4 indicate that much of the sharp increase in the share 
of the Regularly-Employed between 1981 and 1994 can be attributed to the upward mobility due 
to the expansion of international migration opportunities.  As we can see in Table 2 (the bottom 
row), while relatively small numbers of households depended on foreign income during the 
1960s and the 1970s, the number increased dramatically during the 1980s.  Table 4 shows that a 
majority (53%) of the households who moved into the Regularly-Employed class from the other 
social classes between 1981 and 1994 depended on the ‘international migration strategy’ as their 
means of upward mobility.   
More detailed patterns of household mobility can be summarized by a transition matrix 
for each observation period, as shown in Table 5.  We can see that in the period between 1962 
and 1981 a majority of the households did not cross their own class boundary over the five year 
period; all the diagonal entries are greater than 0.5.  Similar transition matrices constructed from 
other developing countries based on relative expenditure (income) rankings typically find that 
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between 30 to 40% (around 25%) of the households remained in the same expenditure (income) 
quintile over a five year period (Baulch and Hoddinott 2000).  Thus, our estimates of more than 
50% of the households remaining in the same social class are consistent with our expectation that 
our notion of social-class mobility would indicate the kind of economic mobility that is of 
longer-term consequences than is mobility indicated by income or expenditure mobility.  The 5 
year-poverty exit (i. e., movements toward the Small-Owner or the Regularly-Employed status) 
probabilities among the Irregularly-Employed were typically below 10% except for the 1971-76 
(see footnote 12 below) and 1981-94 periods when exit probability exceeded 20%, while poverty 
exit probabilities among Tenant farmers were between 10 to 20% except for the 1981-94 period 
when it was 30%.  The quite low exit rate of below 10% appears comparable to the poverty exit 
rate observed among the chronically poor blacks found in the United States (Stevens 1995, p.39).   
During the 1981-1994 period, the transition probability of staying in the same class is 
significantly lower except for that of the Regularly-Employed class, although the 1981-94 
transition matrix cannot be directly compared with the five-year transition matrices in the 
previous periods.  Among the four class categories, the Regularly-Employed class was generally 
the most stable class; once a household reaches this class it is less likely to move downward than 
a household belonging to the lower strata.   
 Within our framework, exit paths from poverty (i. e., upward mobility out of the 
Irregularly-Employed or Tenant status) could potentially take either through the “agricultural 
ladder” toward the Small-Owner status or through non-agricultural regular employment.  Table 6 
shows that the proportion of upward mobility going through the regular employment, rather than 
through the agricultural route, tended to increase over the past three decades both among the 
Irregularly-Employed and Tenant-Farmers (with the only exception being the period between 
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1976-8112).   
 We can also see from the transition matrices (Table 5) that typically 10 to 15% of the 
Irregularly-Employed and the Regularly-Employed households and 10 % or less among Tenant 
farmers or Small-Owner households moved out of the village.13  It appears therefore the 
households from either the top (the Regularly-Employed) or the bottom (the Irregularly-
Employed) of the village strata who are more likely to migrate out of the village.  Or 
alternatively, farm households tend to be geographically less mobile than non-farm households.  
One would expect that Regularly-Employed households emigrate (only) if they find better 
economic opportunities outside the village; this would suggest that, to the extent that the out-
migration of the Regularly-Employed results in upward mobility, our estimated stability (in the 
sense of the high probability of not moving downward) of the Regularly-Employed class could be 
underestimated.  On the other hand, out-migration among the Irregularly-Employed class could 
result either from rural-urban migration seeking better economic opportunities or from rural-rural 
migration resulting in relatively little improvement in socio-economic status.14  Thus, to the 
extent that the former type (urban migration accompanied by upward economic mobility) 
dominates the out-migration among the Irregularly-Employed, our estimate of poverty exit 
probability is likely to be underestimated; if the latter type (rural-rural migration accompanied 
with little improvement in socio-economic status) dominates, on the other hand, our estimated 
poverty exit probability could be overestimated.  The fact that our data set does not include 
information on the households that moved out of the village, therefore, is a major limitation of 
our analysis.  In order to partially rectify this data limitation, we conducted some sensitivity 
analyses with alternative assumptions about the out-migration of the poor, and the results are 
summarized in Appendix.   
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4. The Model 
4.1. Conceptual Model  
 We first introduce a simplified conceptual model that leads to our empirical specification.  
Our model follows the spirit of the theoretical models such as Banerjee and Newman (1993), 
Galor and Zeira (1993) and Ljungqvist (1993) in that social stratification and mobility emerge as 
a result of the credit market failure and the indivisibility of an investment activity.  A village 
household maximizes discounted utility derived from aggregate consumption and leisure:  
 max ( )∑
=
δ
T
0t
L
tt
t L,CU , UC>0 and LLU >0,       (1) 
where Ct  is aggregate consumption and Lt
L  is leisure, respectively, at time t and δ is a discount 
factor.  The household asset consists of land and human capital stock of household members and 
income is generated based on the household’s assets:  
 Yt = ( )FttFt L,A,pf  + h(Ht,Zt) NFtL         (2) 
      = Ct +I t
F +I t
H ,  
where Y t  is the total household income at time t; ( )FttFt L,A,pf  is the farm profit that depends on 
agricultural terms of trade, pt
F  , land, A t , and labor input, Lt
F ;  h(Ht,Zt) is the return of off-farm 
work that depends on human capital stock, H t , degree of off-farm work opportunities, Z t  , and 
off-farm labor Lt
NF .  Income is either consumed (Ct ) or invested in land (I t
F ) or in human capital 
(I t
H ).  The assumption here is that there is no credit market and thus the household is cash 
constrained.  The total labor endowment of the household is given by: 
 Lt =Lt
F +Lt
NF +l ( )HtI +LtL ,         (3) 
where Lt  is the total household labor force at time t, and l ( )HtI  is the labor force enrolled in 
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schools, which is linked to the level of human capital investment I t
H .  The household can control 
its total labor force endowment Lt  through fertility decision.   
 Lt+1 = Lt + DLt,          (4) 
where DLt is the change in household labor force.   
 Given the initial asset endowment (A0, H0), initial labor endowment L0, and a terminal 
condition, the household’s problem is to choose optimal investment in land and human capital 
(I t
F  and I t
H ), consumption Ct, change in the total labor force DLt, and labor force deployment 
among on-farm work, off-farm work, schooling and leisure (Lt
F , Lt
H , l ( )HtI  and LtL ).   
 At any period t, it is possible to distinguish three social “class” categories based on 
household asset accumulation (land and human capital).  These are:  
 (Class 1) Landless Irregularly Employed Class : A t =0, H t < ˜ H .  
 (Class 2) Farmer Class : A t >0, H t < ˜ H .  
 (Class 3) (Non-Agricultural) Regularly Employed Class : A t ≥0, H t ≥ ˜ H .  
where ˜ H  is the threshold level of human capital stock that is required for an economically secure 
occupation (i. e., Regularly Employed status)15.  Given the above definition of “social classes,” 
“class mobility” is induced by changes in land ownership (A t ) and in human capital stock (H t ), 
which in turn are determined by household investments (I t
F  and I t
H ).  Denoting the conditions for 
transition from class j at time t to class k at time t+1 as TRjk(t);  
 TR11(t) = ( ){ }0I ,HH~I and  0A ,H~H FttHttt =−<=<  
 TR12(t) = ( ){ }0I ,HH~I and  0A ,H~H FttHttt >−<=<      (5) 
 TR13(t) = ( ){ }0I ,HH~I and  0A ,H~H FttHttt ≥−≥=<  
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 TR21(t) = ( ){ }tFttHttt AI ,HH~I and  0A ,H~H −=−<><  
 TR22(t) = ( ){ }tFttHttt AI ,HH~I and  0A ,H~H −>−<><  
 TR23(t) = ( ){ }tFttHttt AI ,HH~I and  0A ,H~H −≥−≥><  
 TR31(t) ≡  016,  
 TR32(t) ≡ 0, and  
 TR33(t)= { }tFtHttt AI ,0I and  0A ,H~H −≥≥≥≥ .   
4.2. Empirical Specification 
 Our empirical specification follows McFadden (1973) in deriving multinomial logit 
specification as a reduced form based on the household model described above.  We assume that 
at any time period t the household maximizes its utility over the next five year horizon  by setting 
optimal investment in land (I t
F ) and human capital (I t
H ) and the change in labor endowment 
(DLt ) and its allocation (Lt
F , Lt
H  ), given land (A t ), human capital stock (H t ) and total 
household labor endowment (Lt ) at the beginning of period t.  We then define the indirect utility 
function in a usual manner:   
 max ( )∑
=
δ
T
ts
L
ss
s L,CU ≡ V(t, At, Ht, Lt, Zt, Ftp ),       (6) 
where period “T” means the date five years from period t in terms of calendar time.  By denoting 
the set of state variables as a vector itX  and assuming that the indirect utility can be 
approximated by a linear relation, i. e.,  
 itX  ≡  {t
i, itA , itH , itL ,Zt, Ftp }’ and        (7) 
 jk
i
t
i
Tat k  class
at t j class
t
'V β≈ X ,          (8) 
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, where “ i
Tat k  class
at t j class
t
V ” represents the level of the indirect utility of household i when the household 
move from class j in period t to class k in period T, we estimate the transition probability:  
 ijktP =
( )
( )∑
=
β
β
M
1h
jh
i
t
jk
i
t
'exp
'exp
X
X
,        (9) 
where ijktP  is the probability that household i moves from class j in period t to class k in period T, 
βjk is the parameter vector to be estimated, and M is the total number of class categories (= 4).   
4.3. The Uneven Data Interval 
 One complication in applying the usual multinomial logit specification to our data set is 
the uneven data interval; while the census was conducted in every (almost) five years between 
1962 and 1981, there was a thirteen year interval between 1981 and 1994.  Assuming that the 
class mobility processes follow a first-order Markov chain, we decompose the observed class 
mobility between 1981 and 1994 into three sequential transitions –– between 1981 and 1985, 
between 1985 and 1989, and between 1989 and 1994.17  Then the observed transition probability 
of a household i moving from class j in 1981 to class k in 1994, denoted by Pjk
i (1981− 94), can 
be written as:  
 ∑∑
= =
−−−=−
4
1l
4
1m
i
mk
i
lm
i
jl
i
jk )941989(P)891985(P)851981(P)941981(P ,   (10) 
where j, k, m, and l index social-class categories.  Using equation (9) and (10), we obtain the log 
likelihood function for the entire data set as follows:  
 lnL(β|X) = ∑ ∑∑∑ ∑
= = = = = 


















 β−β
1976
1962t
)t(N
1i
4
1k
4
1j
4
1h
jh
i
tjk
i
t
i
k
i
j )'exp(ln')T(y)t(y XX  +  
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∑ ∑∑ ∑∑
∑∑∑
= = = =
===
























β
β
β
β
β
βN(1981)
1=i
4
1j
4
1k
4
1m
4
1l
4
1h
mh
i
1989
mk
i
1989
4
1h
lh
i
1985
lm
i
1985
4
1h
jh
i
1981
jl
i
1981i
k
i
j
)'exp(
)'exp(
)'exp(
)'exp(
)'exp(
)'exp(
ln)1994(y)1981(y 
X
X
X
X
X
X
            (11) 
where ijy (t) is an index taking value one if household i belongs to class j in period t and zero 
otherwise, ijy (T) is the same index for the period five years after period t, and N(t) is the total 
number of observations in period t.18  The first term of the right hand side is the usual 
multinomial logit log likelihood, which applies to the observations between 1962 and 1981, and 
the second term is the modified likelihood function for the data period between 1981 and 1994.  
For each origin class j, the coefficient vector βjj is normalized to be zero.   
4.3. Explanatory Variables   
 Our explanatory variables consist of household characteristics and economic 
environments.  Household characteristics include the age of the household head, its square and 
three types of household endowments ––labor endowment (as measured by the total number of 
living children regardless of their location of residence); land (measured by the size of the land 
cultivated in hectares for Tenant Farmer households and the size of the land owned for Small-
Owners); and human capital (as measured by the total years of schooling of the household head 
and his/her spouse plus the average years of schooling among children of age over 10).  For the 
Small-Owner class, we also include a dummy variable for ‘owner-tenant’, which takes the value 
one if the household’s cultivated land size is larger than the size of the owned land (by renting in 
additional lands).  We interpret the owner-tenant dummy to capture an aspect of heterogeneity 
among farmers; being an owner-tenant indicates a strong commitment to (or preference for) 
farming as an occupation.19  The variables representing economic environments include:20 the 
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national GDP growth rate (annual average over the five year transition period); real wage rate 
(averaged over the five year transition period) –for Irregularly-Employed and Regularly-
Employed Class; agricultural terms of trade21 (average over the five year transition period)—for 
Tenant Farmer and Small Owner Class.22   
 In addition, a potential source of economic mobility is the change in the returns on 
endowments (e. g., Gunning, et. al. 2000).  In the study village during our observation period, 
there were major changes during the 1980s, such as the drastic explosion of international 
migration opportunities as we saw earlier, which could potentially have major impacts on the 
prospects for household mobility.  We thus test a hypothesis that the returns to household 
endowments (labor, land and human capital), as measured by their impact on the upward 
mobility probability, changed after the early 1980s by including interaction terms between these 
endowment variables and a dummy taking the value one for the observations on the transition 
between 1981 and 1994.  Descriptive statistics of the covariates are shown in Table 7.   
5. Estimation Results 
5.1. Exit Paths from Poverty: Class Mobility from Irregularly-Employed and Tenant-Farmer 
Status  
 
 The first three columns in Table 8 report the estimated coefficients, with t-statistics in 
parentheses, on the determinants of the probability of household class mobility from the 
Irregularly-Employed to the other three classes (relative to the probability of remaining in the 
class of the Irregularly-Employed), and the first five rows in Table 9 show the estimated marginal 
impacts on transition probabilities of the statistically significant covariates.  None of our 
explanatory variables turns out to be statistically significant in determining the transition 
probability of moving from the Irregularly-Employed to the Tenant Farmer class.  This is not 
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surprising, however; based on our informal interviews with farmers in the village, it appears that 
a typical way for a landless laborer to become a tenant farmer or for a tenant farmer to expand his 
operating farm size is that, given the land scarce and labor abundant environment, a landowner 
selectively approaches his prospective tenants based on the reputation such as ‘being hard 
working’ or ‘a good farmer.’  Thus, the acquisition of the tenant status appears to be mainly 
dictated by the combination of such innate ability and personal connections which are 
observable, via reputation within the community, to landowners but unobservable to outside 
researchers.   
The statistically significant determinants of the transition probability of moving from the 
Irregularly-Employed to the Small-Owner class, on the other hand, are the GDP growth rate and, 
after the early 1980s (but not before), the number of children; one percentage point increase in 
(or one standard deviation increase in) GDP growth rate is associated with a 10 (or 32) 
percentage point increase in the transition probability and having one (or one standard deviation) 
additional child raises the transition probability by 8.7 (or 21) percentage points.   
In contrast, the significant determinants of the household mobility from the Irregularly-
Employed toward the Regularly-Employed class are the human capital stock and the GDP growth 
rate.  As expected, education is a key to obtaining the Regularly-Employed status; one additional 
year of (or one standard deviation increase in) schooling is associated with a 0.2 (or 1.3) 
percentage point increase in the transition probability during the 1960s and the 1970s.  
Furthermore, the marginal impact of the years of schooling on the transition probability increased 
fourfold after the 1980s compared to the 1960s and the 1970s.  This appears to reflect the 
expansion in the international migration opportunities, which, as we saw earlier, is a main avenue 
toward the Regularly-Employed status during the period.   
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We thus find that higher macroeconomic growth facilitates upward mobility either 
through the agricultural route (via the Small-Owner status) or through the Regularly-Employed 
status in the non-agricultural sector.  During the 1960s and 1970s, it appears, macroeconomic 
growth was a quantitatively more important determinant of the mobility from the Irregularly-
Employed to the Regularly-Employed status than was the years of schooling; the marginal impact 
of a one standard deviation increase in GDP growth rate was more than five times the marginal 
impact of a one standard deviation increase in schooling.  However, due to the massive increase 
in the ‘returns to education’ the relative importance of the marginal impacts of schooling and of 
GDP growth became much closer after the 1980s.   
 Coefficient estimates for the determinants of class mobility among Tenant farmers are 
found in the third through the sixth columns in Table 8, and the associated marginal impacts of 
the statistically significant covariates in the sixth through the eleventh rows in Table 9.  While 
none of the observable (to the researcher) household characteristics was found to be a significant 
determinant of the household mobility from the Irregularly-Employed to the Tenant status, once a 
household obtains the Tenant-Farmer status, the key to maintaining that status (i. e., preventing 
itself from slipping down to the Irregularly-Employed status) is the farm size; the larger the size 
of the farm that a household cultivates the less likely is the household to move down to the 
Irregularly-Employed class—an additional 1 hectare of (or one standard deviation change in) 
cultivated land is associated with a 0.02 (0.01) percentage point decrease in the probability of 
such downward mobility.  As we discussed earlier, however, this variable could be picking up 
the effects of unobserved innate ability of farmers.   
 As for upward mobility among Tenant-Farmers, the transition probability of moving from 
the Tenant to the Small-Owner class is significantly affected by the level of education, 
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agricultural terms of trade and GDP growth rates.  Among the household characteristics, the level 
of the human capital stock seems to be a more important determinant of the upward mobility 
toward the Small-Owner status than the farm size, which is not a significant determinant.  While 
schooling is a statistically significant determinant, however, its quantitative impact appears to be 
very small—an additional year of schooling (or one standard deviation increase in schooling) is 
associated with only a 0.003 (or 0.02) percentage point increase in the transition probability.  In 
addition, higher agricultural terms of trade apparently provide an incentive for Tenant-Farmers to 
invest in agricultural land and to become Small-Owners; one standard deviation increase in the 
agricultural terms of trade is associated with a 0.3 percentage point increase in the transition 
probability.  The significantly negative effect of higher GDP growth rates on the upward mobility 
toward the Small-Owner class, however, is puzzling.  One possible explanation might be that 
when the GDP growth rate is high the members of Tenant-Farmer households may seek non-
agricultural occupations (while maintaining their farms) rather than investing in agricultural land 
to become Small-Owners.   
Among Tenant-Farmer households, one of the key factors for their upward mobility via 
the non-agricultural route toward the Regularly-Employed status is again the years of schooling; 
an additional year of schooling (or one standard deviation increase in the years of schooling) is 
associated with a one (or 5) percentage point increase in the transition probability.  In addition, 
after the early 1980s (but not before), a larger household labor endowment (after controlling for 
the average schooling among children) tended to facilitate upward mobility through the non-
agricultural sector.  Again this likely reflects the rapid expansion of the international migration 
opportunities which could be better captured if a household has a larger number of household 
members to deploy overseas.  Unlike in the case of Irregularly-Employed households, however, 
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the estimated coefficient on the GDP growth rate was not significantly different from zero.   
While the exit paths from poverty could potentially take agricultural (toward the Small-
Owner status) or non-agricultural (toward the Regularly-Employed status) route, we noted earlier 
that the pathways through the ‘agricultural ladder’ narrowed dramatically after the 1980s.  In 
light of this observation, therefore, a search for exit paths from poverty should perhaps focus on 
the non-agricultural path.  Crucial determinants for poor households to be able to take such a 
path are expanding economic opportunities (such as higher economic growth or overseas 
employment) combined with access to education.   
5.2. Searching for the Determinants of a Stable Rural Middle Class: Small-Owners and the 
Regularly-Employed  
 
 We now turn to the determinants of class mobility among households belonging to the 
upper strata within the village class structure: i. e., the Small-Owner Class and the Regularly-
Employed Class (as shown in the 7th through 12th columns in Table 8 and the 12th through the 
last rows in Table 9).  While the stability of the tenant farmer status is mainly determined by the 
farm size, the significant determinants of the downward mobility from the Small-Owner to the 
Irregularly-Employed status are the number of children, the human capital stock, the size of land 
ownership, and the dummy variable for the ‘owner tenant’ status reflecting a strong commitment 
to farming as an occupation.  Among them, the impact of the number of children apparently 
increased after the early 1980s.  While an additional child (or one standard deviation increase in 
the number of children) was associated with a 0.03 (or 0.09) percentage point increase in the 
transition probability toward the Irregularly-Employed status during the 1960s through the 1970s, 
the marginal impact of labor endowments increased further by more than threefold after the early 
1980s.  Thus, having a larger number of children appears to have opposite effects between the 
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lower and the upper strata within the village; higher fertility facilitates upward mobility among 
the lower social strata (as we saw earlier) but it facilitates downward mobility among Small-
Owners.  An additional year of (or one standard deviation increase in the years of) schooling is 
associated with a 0.02 (or 0.1) percentage point decrease in the (downward) transition 
probability.  An additional hectare of (or one standard deviation increase in) land ownership is 
associated with a 0.16 (or 0.19) percentage point decrease in the downward transition probability, 
while being an owner tenant is associated with a 0.6 percentage point decrease in the transition 
probability.  On the other hand, the key determinants of the downward mobility from the Small-
Owner to the Tenant-Farmer status are the number of children (after the 1980s only) and the size 
of land ownership. An additional child (or one standard deviation increase in the number of 
children) is associated with a 0.02 (or 0.06) percentage point increase in the downward transition 
probability, while an additional hectare (or one standard deviation increase in the landholding 
size) is associated with a 0.17 (or 0.2) percentage point decrease in the downward transition 
probability.   
Main determinants of the transition probability of moving from the Small-Owner class to 
the Regularly-Employed class throughout our observation period are the years of schooling and 
the ‘owner-tenant’ dummy.  In addition, after the early 1980s, the impact of schooling increased, 
and the size of land ownership also emerged as a significant determinant of the mobility from the 
Small-Owner to the Regularly-Employed status.  While an additional year of (or one standard 
deviation increase in) schooling was associated with a 0.1 (or 0.6) percentage point increase in 
the transition probability during the 1960s and the 1970s, such impact of schooling increased 
almost fourfold after the early 1980s.  On the other hand, the marginal impact of the land size 
appears quite large; an additional hectare of land, after the 1980s, is associated with an 11 
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percentage point decrease in the transition probability.  The size of landholding among Small-
Owners may partly reflect the household’s preference or commitment to farming and thus a 
larger landholding could indicate less willingness to exploit the expanding non-agricultural 
employment opportunities in general and the international migration opportunities in particular.   
 The class of Regularly-Employed households is the most stable class with the highest 
probability of staying in the same class (which can be seen from the high diagonal transition 
probabilities in the Transition Matrices in Table 4).  Among the Regularly-Employed households, 
the human capital stock is the key determinant of not moving downward either to the Irregularly-
Employed or to the Tenant-Farmer status.  In the case of the downward mobility toward the 
Irregularly-Employed class, a higher wage rate in the skilled labor market is also associated with 
a lower likelihood of downward mobility.  Significant determinants of the transition from the 
Regularly-Employed to the Small-Owner status, on the other hand, are the household labor 
endowment (only after the early 1980s), wage rates and the GNP growth rates.  It appears that 
both higher wage rates and higher macroeconomic growth induces the Regularly-Employed 
households to invest in agricultural land.  One conspicuous feature of the transition probabilities 
for the Regularly-Employed class, however, is that the marginal impacts of the covariates are 
very small in magnitude across all transition probabilities; the absolute values of the transition 
probabilities are not affected very much by a change in any of the covariates (the last six rows in 
Table 9).   
5.3. Testing for Potential State Dependence 
 Our empirical specification assumes that the social class position of a household five 
years later is determined by the class position and other household characteristics at the initial 
year but is not affected by the history prior to the initial year.  Such an assumption could be 
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violated if, for example, the probability of moving out of poverty is affected by the length of past 
‘spells’ in poverty.  We thus examine whether the transition probability of class mobility is 
potentially affected by state dependence by including lagged dummy variables taking the value 
one if the household belonged to the same social class five year prior to the ‘initial year’ (so we 
test the possibility that the household class position 10 years ago has any additional explanatory 
power, on and above its class position five years ago, of the current household class position).23   
 The results of our likelihood ratio tests are shown in Table 10.  When the joint 
significance of the lagged-same class dummies is tested simultaneously across all origin classes 
the null hypothesis that the lagged-class dummies have no significant effect (across all classes) is 
rejected.  When the significance of the lagged class dummies is tested for each origin class 
separately, however, then the null hypothesis of no state dependence is not rejected for the origin 
class of the Irregularly-Employed and Tenant, but it is rejected for the Small-Owner (at 5% level) 
and the Regularly-Employed (at less than 1% level) classes.  When the significance of the state 
dependence is tested individually for each origin-destination class pair (as shown in the t-
statistics in Table 11), then the lagged-same class dummy has significant (negative) effects for 
the transition probability of moving from the Regularly-Employed to the Small-Owner and to the 
Tenant classes.  The negative coefficients on the dummy variables suggest that if the household 
belonged to the Regularly-Employed class five years prior to the initial year, then the household 
is less likely to move out of that class within the next five years after the initial year.  Based on 
the series of test results taken together, therefore, our results on the significance of the state 
dependence are somewhat mixed, but, to the extent it exists, it is among the upper social strata 
(especially the Regularly-Employed) that the state dependence matters.  But there is little 
indication of state dependence among the lower social strata once observable household 
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characteristics and economic environments are controlled.   
6. Discussions 
6.1. Comparison with the Existing Studies on LDC Poverty Dynamics  
 Our empirical results confirm the importance of the major determinants of (chronic) 
poverty dynamics that have typically been identified in past studies, such as schooling, access to 
land and other household assets, and changes in the returns to (rather than the accumulation of) 
endowments (e. g., human capital) (e. g., Gaiha and Deolaliker 1993, Jalan and Ravallion 2000, 
McCullock and Baulch 2000, Gunning, et al. 2000).  It is reassuring to obtain broadly similar 
findings in terms of household-level determinants of poverty dynamics despite the use of quite 
different definitions of being ‘chronically poor.’24  One major contrast of our findings with 
previous findings, however, concerns the effects of the household size on poverty.  Both static 
and dynamic analyses of poverty determinants have typically found that a larger household size is 
positively associated with the probability of being poor.  In contrast, we find that a larger number 
of children (after controlling the average level of education) had a positive impact on the 
probability of exiting poverty, especially after the 1980s.  In the Philippines, the population 
growth has remained relatively high in the recent few decades and the spread of family planning 
has been slow.  Such a phenomenon has often been attributed to cultural or religious reasons (e. 
g., the Filipinos being dominantly Roman Catholic) given the typically-found negative 
associations between larger household size and household welfare.  Instead, our results suggest 
that such behavior of the poor could in fact be economically rational as well.   
 Furthermore, the long observation period of our dataset has allowed us to address issues 
that had not been examined in the existing literature such as the effects of macroeconomic 
environments on poverty dynamics,25 the relative importance between household characteristics 
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and economic environments in determining poverty exit, and the potential state dependence in 
poverty exit.  Our findings suggest, in particular, that the relative importance among the 
determinants of poverty dynamics —and therefore the effective policy interventions for poverty 
reduction— could change over time.   
6.2. Comparison with the U. S. Poverty Dynamics  
 While this paper has also identified a similar set of determinants of poverty dynamics as 
those found in the studies in the United States such as schooling, demographic composition of 
the household, and macroeconomic growth (e. g., Hanratty and Blank 1992, Sawhill 1988, 
Stevens 1995), there are some marked differences in the determinants of poverty exits between 
our findings and those from the United States.  Among the more obvious differences are the 
major role of agricultural land played in the rural Philippines and the importance of race and the 
government transfer in explaining poverty dynamics in the United States.  Furthermore, while 
female headship is among the major determinants of the U. S. poverty dynamics female headship 
in the rural Philippines does not seem to be an important explanatory variable of poverty 
dynamics.26  The relationship between household demographics and poverty dynamics appears to 
be one of the areas that require closer scrutiny in country (or region within a country) specific 
contexts.   
 In addition, another major contrast is our finding that there is little evidence of potential 
state dependence in poverty dynamics after controlling for the household characteristics and 
economic environments.  The U. S. studies tend to find the persistence of poverty status being 
significantly correlated with past spells in poverty (e. g., Bane and Ellwood 1988, Stevens 1995).  
While a portion of the poor in the United States appears to constitute a social ‘underclass’ whose 
poverty status may be self-perpetuating, the poor countries are (or, at least the village under study 
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is) sufficiently dynamic so that persistent poverty due to state dependence (or due to unobserved 
heterogeneity) may not be as serious as in the United States.  In other words, policy interventions 
addressing the observed determinants (especially access to education and economic growth) 
could well go a long way in pulling the poor out of poverty in developing countries.   
7. Conclusions 
 We find that the size of initial endowments (labor, land and human capital) is a 
significant determinant of economic mobility, as predicted by the theoretical models of 
household asset accumulation with a credit market failure.  Furthermore, we find evidence that 
the returns to the household endowments increased significantly in some particular contexts after 
the early 1980s when opportunities for international migration from the village expanded 
substantially.  For example, the returns to human capital (for the Irregularly-Employed) and labor 
endowments (for Tenants) in acquiring the Regularly-Employed status increased significantly.  
Since a parallel increase in the returns to land is not observed, the relative importance for upward 
mobility of the human capital among the household endowments increased relative to that of land 
after the early 1980s.  In addition, having a larger number of children had positive impacts on 
upward mobility, especially after the early 1980s, among the lower social strata, but had positive 
impacts on downward mobility among Small-Owners.  Thus a larger family size seems to help 
the poor but to hurt the middle class.   
 There is some evidence that higher agricultural terms of trade help accumulation in the 
agricultural sector.  In light of our observation of the rapid narrowing of the ‘agricultural ladder,’ 
however, the effectiveness of this route as a major pathway from poverty might be questioned.  
The key to the pathways out of rural poverty through the non-agricultural path is the combination 
of human capital investment and rapidly expanding economic opportunities as reflected in higher 
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economic growth.  While in the 1960s and the 1970s economic growth was a quantitatively more 
important determinant than the human capital investment, the substantial increase in the returns 
to schooling after the early 1980s has made both factors more or less equally important for 
poverty exit paths.  Finally, unlike the findings from the U.S. data, we do not find evidence that 
‘poverty spells’ significantly affect the probability of poverty exit.   
 What implications can we draw in designing policies to facilitate exits from poverty in 
the rural Philippines?  First, we should (once again) note that the role of the ‘agricultural ladder’ 
as a pathway out of poverty diminished dramatically after the 1980s; thus, agricultural 
development and land reform alone, for example, would perhaps not be able to lift the mass of 
the rural poor out of poverty.  Pulling the mass out of rural poverty through the non-agricultural 
path requires investment in human capital and higher economic growth.  We find that 
international migration also played a major role in pulling the landless poor into a higher 
economic status for those who could take advantage of the opportunities with human capital 
endowments.  Secondly, we find evidence that returns to labor endowments also increased 
among the lower social strata (but not among the upper strata within the village).  A possibly 
disturbing implication is that policy efforts at promoting family planning among the poor could 
be frustrated (and have been frustrated indeed in the Philippines) due to such an economic 
incentive.  Finally as a somewhat optimistic note, the lack of state dependence in poverty 
dynamics could suggest that, in contrast with the poverty in the United States, policy 
interventions affecting the observed determinants may well go a long way in pulling the rural 
poor out of poverty in the rural Philippines.   
 
APPENDIX: Potential Sampling Biases Due To Out-Migration 
 As noted in Section 3, one limitation of our dataset is the fact that the households who 
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emigrated in their entirety were not followed, potentially leading to biased inferences about 
poverty dynamics.  In order to address this issue, albeit partially, we made some attempts to 
check the robustness of our results.  In one set of exercises we make some additional 
assumptions about either upward or downward mobility among emigrating households at the 
time of their migration and re-estimate the determinants of transition probabilities to see if 
qualitative conclusions are affected.  In the second exercise we add ‘emigration’ as the 5th 
destination state in our transition probability estimation (added to the four social class categories) 
and check if the inferences about the determinants of class mobility dynamics within the village 
are affected.   
 Since relatively higher proportions of households emigrate among the Regularly-
Employed and the Irregularly-Employed classes than among the other two classes, we re-
estimated the logit transition probabilities with additional assumptions about the welfare changes 
for the emigrants originating from the Regularly-Employed and the Irregularly-Employed classes.  
Among the Regularly-Employed, it appears more likely that the welfare level of emigrating 
households would be at least as high at the destination (possibly in urban areas) as before 
migration (otherwise they would not choose to migrate).  Thus, we made an additional 
assumption that all the out-migrating households from the Regularly-Employed class belong to 
the Regularly-Employed class after migration.  For the Irregularly-Employed households, on the 
other hand, the welfare level of emigrating households could be either higher (possibly through 
urban migration with better jobs) or about the same (possibly rural-rural migration ending up 
with the same Irregularly-Employed status in the new location) after migration, and it is difficult 
to predict a priori which pattern would dominate.  We thus tried two opposite cases with extreme 
assumptions: one assuming that all the emigrating Irregularly-Employed households move 
toward the Regularly-Employed status in the destination location, and the other assuming that all 
the emigrating Irregularly-Employed households remain Irregularly-Employed in the destination.   
 While the majority of our qualitative results (i. e., sign and statistical significance) 
regarding the determinants of mobility are largely robust, there are a few that may be somewhat 
sensitive to potential sampling bias.  In particular, assuming that emigration of a Regularly-
Employed household does not involve any downward mobility and that all emigrating 
Irregularly-Employed households remain Irregularly-Employed in the destination location, the 
observed increases after the 1980s in the marginal impact of education on movements from the 
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Irregularly-Employed to the Regularly-Employed status and of the number of children on 
movements from the Irregularly-Employed to the Regularly-Employed are still positive but not 
statistically significant.27  Under the (rather unlikely) assumption that all the out-migrating 
Irregularly-Employed households obtain the Regularly-Employed status in the destination 
location (and that emigration of a Regularly-Employed household does not involve any 
downward mobility), on the other hand, both higher GDP growth rates and the years of schooling 
before the 1980s become insignificant determinants of the mobility from the Irregularly-
Employed toward the Regularly-Employed status.28   
 In our second approach to checking the robustness of our findings against potential 
sampling biases, we examine whether qualitative findings are affected when ‘emigration’ is 
explicitly included as the 5th choice alternative (in addition to the four social-class destinations).  
We re-estimate our model as a 5 state-multinomial logit, and compare the coefficients between 
the model with and the one without the emigration option.  The qualitative results are mostly 
unaffected by the addition of this 5th state (except that the number of children now has negative 
and significant effects on the transition from the Irregularly-Employed to the Regularly-
Employed status).  In addition, the robustness of quantitative results can be tested formally by 
applying Hausman and McFadden’s (1984) test for the independence from irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA) property.  If IIA assumption is not rejected by the data, then the inclusion or exclusion of 
the additional destination state of ‘emigration’ would not affect the estimation results focusing on 
the class transitions within the village.  Our test results reject the IIA assumption indicating that 
while our qualitative findings are largely robust the quantitative results may be sensitive to the 
addition of the 5th state.   
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1. See Baulch and Hoddinott (2000) and Helme (forthcoming) for survey of recent literature.    
2. Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) is a classic contribution in this theme in the static framework and 
more recent theoretical models, such as Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993) 
and Ljungqvist (1993), further extend this theme in dynamic model frameworks.  These dynamic 
models generally show that the combination of credit market imperfections and some kind of 
indivisibility of one of the investment activities (e. g., human capital investment) leads to various 
patterns of social stratification as steady-state equilibria that are dependent on the patterns of 
initial distribution of wealth.  Earlier, Loury (1981) showed that the existence of credit market 
imperfection alone did not necessarily generate long-run stratification patterns that depended on 
the initial distribution.  Thus, both the credit market failure and indivisibility conditions are 
necessary to generate the kind of social stratification patterns discussed in these models (e. g., 
Bardhan and Udry 1999, p. 130)   
3. Examples include: Adelman, et al. (1992), Dreze, Lanjouw and Stern (1992), Swaminathan 
(1991), etc.   
4. Fuwa (1999) actually examines social class mobility rather than income or expenditure 
mobility and covers a 20 year period, of which this paper is a direct extension in numerous 
directions, including the number of years covered by the data.  Also, Gaiha and Deolalikar (1992) 
use the ICRISAT data set covering a 10 year period.   
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5. Household censuses between 1962 through 1981 were collected by James N. Anderson, an 
anthropologist at University of California at Berkeley, and 1994 census was carried out by the 
author.     
6. See, for example, Dreze, Lanjouw and Stern (1992), Jalan and Ravallion (2000) and 
Swaminathan (1991).  Bauluch and Hoddinot (2000) includes a survey.   
7 Helme (forthcoming) provides additional rationales for the 5 year cut-off for defining chronic 
poverty.   
8. During the period between 1962 and 1981 roughly 95%, and 83% in 1994, of the main income 
earners were the (self-reported) household heads in the survey.   
9. Thus, those farm households who have land ownership of less than one third of a hectare are 
categorized as Tenant-Farmers in our classification.   
10. The poverty line used here is based on a daily caloric requirement of 2000 Kcal plus a portion 
of non-food  consumption with regional cost of living adjustment (for Pangasinan Province) as 
obtained in Balisacan (1999).   
11. Based on Table 1, it might seem pointless to distinguish between the Irregularly-Employed 
and the Tenant class.  We do maintain this distinction in our empirical analysis, however, since 
there are a few reasons, which are not reflected in the income figures, to believe that the 
difference between these two classes could still be significant, especially during the early period 
(the 1960s to the 1970s) of our data set; (a) the non-agricultural income opportunities for the 
Irregularly-Employed were likely to be more limited and thus there possibly could have been a 
significant income differential in the earlier periods (though we do not have data to verify), (b) as 
Anderson (1964) noted in the village, tenant farmers have potential access to informal insurance 
or credit transactions through the ‘patron-client’ type relationships with the landowners (although 
such relationships apparently weakened over time and had mostly disappeared by the mid-
1990s), and (c) becoming a tenant farmer from the Irregularly-Employed status could be seen as a 
significant first step through the ‘agricultural ladder’ toward upward mobility.   
12. A possible reason for the high mobility toward the Regularly-Employed status in the 1971-76 
period is the construction boom in Manila during the early years of the Marcos martial law 
regime during the 1970s.  Our census data indicate that a large number of relatively young tenant 
farmers as well as irregularly-employed workers were employed as contract workers in the 
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metropolitan Manila area in the early to mid 1970s.  Many of them came back to the village and 
became (back to) tenant farmers after the boom in the late 1970s.   
13. The only exception was the 24% of the Regularly-Employed who moved out during the 1966-
1971 period.   
14. Based on the author’s informal interviews with village residents, one common reason for 
rural-rural migration in this village appears to be that, during their early periods of their married 
life, they live alternately close to the parents of both the household head and of his spouse who 
are usually from nearby villages.   
15. For simplicity, unlike in our empirical analysis, distinction is not made here between the 
‘tenant farmer’ and the ‘small owner’ classes.   
16. Since human capital (unlike land) cannot generally be “liquidated,” human capital investment 
(I t
H ) here is assumed to be non-negative.  Consequently class transition from the “Regularly 
Employed” class to other classes cannot occur through household investments in our framework, 
which is denoted as “≡ 0” for TR31(t) and TR32(t).  These transitions can, and do, occur in reality 
through the choice of total labor endowment (such as retirement and household split) or through 
exogenous changes (such as loss of a job that the main income supporter of the household used 
to hold or death of household members).  This model predicts, however, that the Regularly-
Employed class is likely to be more stable than the other class categories. 
17. Here we are additionally assuming that the difference between the assumed 5 year transition 
and actually applied data years (i. e., 4 years) in some portions -- i. e.,  1962-66, 1981-85, 1985-
89 -- is negligible.   
18. While our specification does not require information on the class position of households in 
1985 or 1989, it does require the X t
i  vectors for those years.  Among the household 
characteristics included in the X t
i  vector, age of the household head and the number of children 
(abstracting from infant/child mortality) are obtained from the 1981 and 1994 data and land 
holding and average years of schooling among (current) household members are estimated as 
weighted average of the 1981 and 1994 data.   
19. This interpretation is based on Anderson (1964), which contains a detailed discussion of the 
distinct characteristics of owner-tenants among the small owner farmers.  The ‘owner-tenants’ in 
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our study village tend to be committed farmers who are relatively more “innovative and 
progressive.”    
20. Since these macroeconomic variables are common across all households, the only source of 
variability in these variables comes from their variation over time.   
21. Measured by the ratio of rice price to the weighted average of the CPI and an index of farm 
expenditure.  The index of farm expenditure was constructed as the weighted average of farm 
wage index and fertilizer price index.  The weighting for the cost side was based on the data from 
Hayami et al (1978).   
22. Theoretically, both wage rates and agricultural terms of trade could affect class mobility across 
all class categories.  However since it would be difficult to identify the differential impacts of 
two price variables in our model due to the small number of data points (since the only source of 
variation in the macroeconomic variables are changes over time), only one of the two price 
variables that is likely (on a priori basis) to have a more direct connection to each origin class is 
included.   
23. The correlation between the current and the past states could result either from the ‘true state 
dependence’ or from ‘spurious state dependence’ due to unobserved heterogeneity (e. g., 
Heckman 1981).  This possible distinction, however, is not pursued further here since, as we see 
below, we find no evidence of potential state dependence among the poor.    
24. Additional determinants of economic mobility/poverty dynamics that are found in the existing 
empirical literature but are not addressed here include: variability of asset holding (e. g., Jalan 
and Ravallion 2000), credit access (e. g., Wydick 1999) and access to social capital (e. g., 
Mauliccio, et al. 2000).   
25. As an exception, Gaiha and Deolalikar (1993) include a time trend as an explanatory variable 
in their study of the 10 year ICRISAT panel which they interpret as the effects of macroeconomic 
environments.   
26. At one point, we included the dummy variable indicating female headed households in our 
specification but the coefficient was not statistically significant in any of the class transition 
probabilities.  Thus we excluded it from the final results reported in the previous section.   
27. In addition, the effects of education on movements from the Small-Owner to the Regularly-
Employed status and of the number of children on movements from the Small-Owner to the 
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Irregularly-Employed status are also no longer statistically significant.  While detailed results are 
not reported here, they are available from the author upon request.   
28 There are additional variables that are no longer statistically significant under these 
assumptions: the effects of education on movements from the Regularly-Employed to the Tenant 
status, the effects of education on movements from the Small-Owner to the Regularly-Employed 
and the effects of the number of children on movements from the Small-Owner to the Irregularly-
Employed.   
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Table 1. Mean Income and Poverty Incidence by Social-Class Categories 1994 
 Irregularly employed Tenant Small owner Regularly 
employed 
average per capita income P 5,934 P 5,230 P 8,620 P 20,575 
Poverty incidence* 0.6643 0.7188 0.5588 0.1787 
* poverty line: P 6,091.62. (source: household censuses collected by James N. Anderson and the author. See text.)   
 
Table 2. Percentage Distribution of Households by Social Class  
and Number of International Migrants, 1962-1994 
Year 1962 1966 1971 1976 1981 1994 
1. Irregularly employed 24.4% 28.8% 28.6% 28.3% 33.1% 29.3% 
2. Tenant 32.1% 28.8% 30.9% 27.1% 28.2% 20.1% 
3. Small owner 29.0% 24.0% 17.6% 17.9% 14.1% 7.1% 
4. Regularly employed 14.5% 18.5% 22.9% 26.7% 24.5% 43.6% 
   (% OFW* supported)* (1.2%) (1.1%) (2.0%) (3.3%) (7.2%) (17.4%) 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Total number of  Households 262 271 301 329 347 478 
Total number of Households  
with OFWs** 
 
1 
 
4 
 
14 
 
21 
 
44 
 
212 
* :Percentage of the household mainly supported by international migrants or ‘OFWs’ (Overseas Filipino Workers) 
**The number represents the number of heads, spouses or children of the households in the village (who did or did 
not make income contributions to these households) or others who gave financial support to the households residing 
in the village.  (source: household censuses collected by James N. Anderson and the author.  See text.)   
 
Table 3. Original Households in 1962 by Social Class and Their Destination in 1994 
 Destination in 1994 Class total  
Class in 1962 Irregularly 
employed 
Tenant Small owner Regularly 
employed 
not 
present 
in 1962 
Irregularly employed 6 0 2 7 49 64 
Tenant 12 13 1 13 45 84 
Small owner 3 2 6 12 53 76 
Regularly employed 0 0 1 9 28 38 
Total 21 15 10 41 175 262 
(source: household censuses collected by James N. Anderson and the author.  See text.)   
 
Table 4. Upward Mobility toward Regularly-Employed Status and International Migration 
between 1981-1994 
 Origin class Total moved into  
 Irregularly-
employed 
Tenant Small-
owner 
Regularly-
employed class 
Number of upwardly mobile households  25 24 8 57 
Upwardly mobile households with  
  international ‘migration strategy’ 
14 
(56%) 
10 
(42%) 
6 
(75%) 
30 
(53%) 
(source: household censuses collected by James N. Anderson and the author.  See text.)   
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Table 5. Transition Matrices 
Transition Matrix 1962-1966 
1966
1962 irreg.employed tenant farmer small owner reg.employed hh dissolution emigration
irreg.employed 0.531 0.109 0.047 0.016 0.141 0.156
tenant farmer 0.131 0.571 0.119 0.036 0.071 0.071
small owner 0.132 0.105 0.513 0.079 0.066 0.105
reg.employed 0.026 0.000 0.079 0.605 0.132 0.158
hh formation 0.317 0.268 0.195 0.220 NA NA
immigration 0.391 0.174 0.087 0.348 NA NA  
Transition Matrix 1966-1971 
1971
1966 irreg.employed tenant farmer small owner reg.employed hh dissolution emigration
irreg.employed 0.564 0.128 0.013 0.038 0.115 0.141
tenant farmer 0.115 0.679 0.090 0.013 0.038 0.064
small owner 0.092 0.077 0.585 0.108 0.062 0.077
reg.employed 0.040 0.020 0.040 0.600 0.060 0.240
hh formation 0.357 0.333 0.071 0.238 NA NA
immigration 0.250 0.250 0.050 0.450 NA NA  
Transition Matrix 1971-1976 
1971
1966 irreg.employed tenant farmer small owner reg.employed hh dissolution emigration
irreg.employed 0.547 0.081 0.081 0.128 0.093 0.070
tenant farmer 0.118 0.570 0.118 0.075 0.054 0.065
small owner 0.113 0.170 0.604 0.075 0.038 0.000
reg.employed 0.014 0.058 0.043 0.725 0.043 0.116
hh formation 0.429 0.321 0.143 0.107 NA NA
immigration 0.421 0.184 0.053 0.342 NA NA  
Transition Matrix 1976-1981 
1981
1976 irreg.employed tenant farmer small owner reg.employed hh dissolution emigration
irreg.employed 0.531 0.109 0.047 0.016 0.141 0.156
tenant farmer 0.131 0.571 0.119 0.036 0.071 0.071
small owner 0.132 0.105 0.513 0.079 0.066 0.105
reg.employed 0.026 0.000 0.079 0.605 0.132 0.158
hh formation 0.317 0.268 0.195 0.220 NA NA
immigration 0.391 0.174 0.087 0.348 NA NA  
Transition Matrix 1981-1994 
1994
1981 irreg.employed tenant farmer small owner reg.employed hh dissolution emigration
irreg.employed 0.357 0.035 0.009 0.217 0.217 0.165
tenant farmer 0.153 0.408 0.051 0.245 0.082 0.061
small owner 0.041 0.122 0.245 0.163 0.306 0.122
reg.employed 0.035 0.035 0.024 0.588 0.165 0.153
hh formation 0.322 0.217 0.066 0.395 NA NA
immigration 0.353 0.118 0.047 0.482 NA NA  
(source: household censuses collected by James N. Anderson and the author.  See text.)   
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Table 6. Upward Mobility Probabilities: Agricultural vs. Non-agricultural Routes 
Period Irregularly-Employed Tenant-farmer 
 agriculture1 non-
agriculture2 
agriculture3 non-
agriculture4 
1962-66 0.156 0.016 0.119 0.036 
1966-71 0.141 0.038 0.090 0.013 
1971-76 0.162 0.128 0.118 0.075 
1976-81 0.156 0.016 0.119 0.036 
1981-94 0.044 0.217 0.051 0.245 
1 transition probability of moving from the Irregularly-Employed to the Tenant or the Small-Owner class.  
2 transition probability of moving from the Irregularly-Employed class to the Regularly-Employed class.   
3 transition probability of moving from the Tenant to the Small-Owner class.    
4  transition probability of moving from the Tenant to the Regularly-Employed class.   
 (source: household censuses collected by James N. Anderson and the author.  See text.)   
 
 
Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Regression Covariates 
Variable mean std.dev min Max 
HH age 45.449 13.080 20 90 
Number of children1 4.875 2.621 0 12 
Education2  13.854 6.786 0 38 
Land size, cultivated (hectare) 0.658 0.912 0 8 
Land size, owned (hectare) 0.390 0.887 0 9 
Ag. terms of trade3 10.693 1.400 8.610 12.766 
Wage rate index, unskilled4 2.451 0.607 1.699 3.251 
Wage rate index, skilled4 2.679 0.726 1.895 3.682 
GDP growth rate4 4.063 3.077 -1.933 6.671 
Number of observations 1199 
1 total number of the children of the household head, including those living outside the household.   2 sum total years 
of schooling among the household head, his/her spouse and the average years of schooling among the children older 
than age 10.   3 ratio of rice price to the weighted average of CPI and an index of farm expenditure which is 
constructed as the weighted average of farm wage index and fertilizer price index (averaged over the 5 year 
transition period).  4 averaged over the 5 year transition period (1972=1.00)   
(source: household censuses collected by James N. Anderson and the author.  See text.)   
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T
able 8. E
stim
ated C
oefficients (M
axim
um
 L
ikelihood E
stim
ation) + 
N
um
ber of observations: 1199      Log likelihood: -915.099       Pseudo-R
 squared: 0.1819 
Independent  
origin class = Irregularly-Em
ployed
origin class = Tenant 
origin class = Sm
all ow
ner 
origin class = R
egularly-Em
ployed 
V
ariables 
destination class = 
destination class = 
destination class = 
destination class = 
 
R
egularly- 
Em
ployed 
Sm
all- 
O
w
ner 
Tenant 
Farm
er 
R
egularly- 
Em
ployed
Sm
all- 
O
w
ner 
Irregularly-
Em
ployed
R
egularly- 
Em
ployed 
Tenant 
Farm
er 
Irregularly-
Em
ployed
Sm
all- 
O
w
ner 
Tenant 
Farm
er 
Irregularly-
Em
ployed
C
onstant 
-4.1166  
(-1.01) 
-16.0459 
(-3.25) 
3.2365  
(1.08) 
6.2851  
(1.35) 
-11.6208 
(-2.64) 
2.7888  
(0.97) 
0.7021  
(0.17) 
-3.1010 
(-0.73) 
5.0720  
(1.04) 
-24.4500 
(-2.80) 
-4.8255 
(-0.68) 
6.0099  
(0.71) 
H
H
 A
ge  
-1.6749  
(-1.19) 
0.8983  
(0.43) 
-1.4130 
(-1.20) 
-5.3790
**
(-2.78) 
-0.6112  
(-0.47) 
-1.6175
* 
(-1.69) 
-0.8449  
(–0.81) 
0.7744 
(0.51) 
-1.043  
(-0.91) 
5.4831
* 
(1.73) 
1.3062 
(0.37) 
2.2600  
(0.72) 
H
H
 A
ge squared 
0.1777  
(1,20) 
-0.1357  
(-0.57) 
0.1296  
(1.01) 
0.5382
** 
(2.74) 
0.1061  
(0.79) 
0.1935
* 
(1.97) 
0.0814  
(0.84) 
-0.1156 
(-0.74) 
0.0628  
(0.58) 
-0.5084
* 
(-1.65) 
-0.2090 
(-0.47) 
-0.2739  
(-0.82) 
N
o. C
hildren 
0.0289  
(0.26) 
0.0439  
(0.24) 
0.1255  
(0.98) 
0.2298  
(1.26) 
-0.0695  
(-0.76) 
0.0418  
(0.48) 
0.0765  
(0.69) 
0.0231 
(0.25) 
0.1900
* 
(1.87) 
-0.0829  
(-0.43) 
0.2129 
(0.67) 
0.0867  
(0.61) 
N
o. C
hildren*80s 
-0.7701  
(-1.35) 
1.1892
** 
(2.01) 
-1.3088 
(-0.74) 
3.0027
* 
(1.89) 
0.1305  
(0.18) 
0.4155  
(0.92) 
0.3909  
(1.61) 
0.4303
* 
(1.69) 
0.6643
* 
(1.84) 
0.5188
* 
(1.80) 
0.3325 
(0.69) 
-3.0302  
(-0.26) 
Education 
0.0880
* 
(1.65) 
0.1098  
(1.60) 
0.0101  
(0.22) 
0.1452
*  
(1.95) 
0.1643
** 
(3.39) 
-0.0307  
(-0.60) 
0.0631
* 
(1.71) 
0.0273 
(0.71) 
-0.0907
* 
(-1.85) 
-0.0846  
(-1.47) 
-0.1446
*
(-1.81) 
-0.0992
**
(-2.06) 
Education*80s 
0.3167
** 
(2.19) 
-0.1662  
(-0.71) 
0.0088  
(0.03) 
-0.6860  
(-1.12) 
-0.3378  
(-0.97) 
0.1250  
(0.84) 
0.1673
** 
(2.01) 
0.0295 
(0.37) 
-0.0767  
(-0.41) 
0.1279  
(1.52) 
0.0309 
(0.17) 
-0.3184  
(-0.50) 
Land size 
 
 
 
-0.5993  
(-1.00) 
0.3851  
(1.39) 
-0.7731
**
(-2.75) 
-0.0170  
(-0.10) 
-3.0226
**
(-3.21) 
-0.9193
**
(-2.22) 
 
 
 
Land size *80s 
 
 
 
-10.2238 
(-1.08) 
-3.5492  
(-0.89) 
-9.9631  
(-1.54) 
-6.5724
** 
(-3.47) 
-4.2297 
(-1.40) 
-5.7847  
(-1.04) 
 
 
 
O
w
ner Tenant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-2.0551
** 
(-3.48) 
0.4246 
(0.79) 
-2.6767
**
(-4.54) 
 
 
 
A
g. Term
 of Trade  
 
 
 
-0.6802  
(-0.99) 
1.8806
** 
(3.65) 
0.1350  
(0.35) 
0.0187  
(0.05) 
0.0824 
(0.24) 
-0.3784  
(-0.76) 
 
 
 
W
age  
-0.1255  
(-0.21) 
0.8823  
(0.87) 
0.0733  
(0.20) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1039
* 
(1.87) 
-1.1313 
(-1.21) 
-1.3020
**
(-2.35) 
G
D
P G
row
th  
0.8195
** 
(2.34) 
1.4296
** 
(3.50) 
-0.4183 
(-1.32) 
1.5303  
(1.45) 
-2.3573
**
(-3.45) 
-0.3576  
(-0.63) 
-0.2753  
(-0.84) 
0.1957 
(0.48) 
0.5586  
(0.84) 
1.1150
** 
(2.38) 
0.7565 
(1.25) 
-1.4522  
(-1.57) 
+ t statistics in parentheses (standard errors obtained by B
H
H
H
 m
ethod.);  **: significant at 5%
 level  *: significant at 10%
 level;  
 (source: household censuses collected by Jam
es N
. A
nderson and the author.  See text.)   
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Table 9. Marginal Impacts on Transition Probability of Statistically Significant Covariates  
Class Transition and  Marginal impact on probability as measured by: 
statistically significant covariates: dP/dx dP/dx*std. deviation Elasticity 
From Irregularly-Employed to Small-Owner: 
   Number of Children (after 80s)  0.0870 0.2131 4.9966 
   GDP growth rate 0.1003 0.3232 5.1724 
From Irregularly-Employed to Regularly-Employed: 
   Education   0.0024 0.0127 0.8822 
   Education (after 80s) 0.0099 0.0527 3.6745 
   GDP growth rate  0.0212 0.0682 2.6729 
From Tenant-Farmer to Irregularly-Employed: 
   Land size -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.2350 
From Tenant-Farmer to Small-Owner: 
   Education  0.00003 0.0002 0.3506 
   Ag. terms of trade 0.00188 0.0027 20.4162 
   GDP growth rate -0.00222 -0.0070 -8.9080 
From Tenant-Farmer to Regularly-Employed: 
   Number of children (after 80s) 0.2000 0.5345 1.1234 
   Education 0.0096 0.0513 0.1228 
From Small-Owner to Irregularly-Employed: 
   Number of children 0.0003 0.0009 0.9781 
   Number of children (after 80s) 0.0011 0.0030 3.4079 
   Education  -0.0002 -0.0010 -1.3785 
   Land size  -0.0016 -0.0019 -1.0818 
   Owner-tenant dummy  -0.0058   
From Small-Owner to Tenant-Farmer: 
   Number of children (after 80s) 0.0002 0.0006 2.1932 
   Land size -0.0017 -0.0021 -3.5662 
From Small-Owner to Regularly-Employed: 
   Education  0.0010 0.0064 0.9358 
   Education (after 80s)  0.0027 0.0169 2.4773 
   Land size (after 80s)  -0.1076 -0.1311 -7.6194 
   Owner-tenant dummy -0.0390   
From Regularly-Employed to Irregularly-Employed: 
   Education  -9.936D-13 -8.0957 D-12 1.8515 
   Wage rate  -1.3048 D-11 -8.7447 D-12 -3.2731 
From Regularly-Employed to Tenant-Farmer: 
   Education  -0.0001 -0.0009 -2.7008 
From Regularly-Employed to Small-Owner: 
   Number of children (after 80s) 9.8736 D-06 0.00003 2.3674 
   Wage rate 0.00002 0.00001 2.7795 
   GDP growth rate 0.00002 0.00007 4.3149 
(source: household censuses collected by James N. Anderson and the author.  See text.)   
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Table 10. Likelihood Ratio Test Results for State Dependence 
 
1. State dependence tested simultaneously among all origin classes   
H0 (null hypothesis) H1 Chi-square test  
statistic (d.f.) 
P-value  
Lagged-same-class dummies has no  
effects (full model with no lagged-class 
dummy) 
Unrestricted full model with 
lagged-same-class dummies 
across all classes 
26.9010 (12) 0.008** 
 
 
2. State dependence tested separately for each origin class  
Origin class H0 (null hypothesis) H1 Chi-square test statistic 
 (d.f.) 
P-value  
Regularly-Employed 12.8281 (3) 0.0050** 
Small-Owner 7.6883 (3) 0.0529* 
Tenant Farmer 0.8644 (3) 0.8340 
Irregularly-Employed 
Lagged-same-class  
dummies have no  
effects on a particular 
class origin. 
Unrestricted full model  
with lagged-same-class  
dummies among all  
classes 4.5584 (3) 0.2071 
**: significant at 5% level  *: significant at 10% level 
(source: household censuses collected by James N. Anderson and the author.  See text.)   
 
Table 11. Estimated Coefficients on the Lagged-Same Class Dummy  
in a Model with State Dependence+  
Number of observations: 776      Log likelihood: -571.642       Pseudo-R squared: 0.2314  
 
 destination class = 
Origin class Irregularly- Employed Tenant Farmer Small- Owner Regularly- Employed 
Irregularly- Employed — -0.5768 (-0.99) -2.0937 (-1.06) -1.0828 (-1.21) 
Tenant Farmer -0.4282 (-0.71) — -0.3502 (-0.50) -0.1022 (-0.12) 
Small- Owner -1.1956 (-1.38) -0.5771 (-0.90) — 1.0817 (1.31) 
Regularly- Employed -1.1188 (-1.09) -1.9611 (-1.76)* -1.7766 (-2.08) ** — 
 
+Covariates included in addition to the lagged-same class dummies are identical to those included in Table 9.  
Coefficient estimates for those other covariates are not reported here but available upon request from the author.   
++ t statistics in parentheses;  **: significant at 5% level  *: significant at 10% level; standard errors obtained by 
BHHH.  
 (source: household censuses collected by James N. Anderson and the author.  See text.)   
 
